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There is something rather ‘queer’ about the protagonists of Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 
novel Never Let Me Go.  Living outside of conventional family and kinship structures, 
they affirm a collective identity defined against those they term the ‘normals’ 
(Ishiguro, p. 94).  Taught from childhood to understand their difference as 
categorical and as residing in their inability to reproduce, they are subject to the 
irrational prejudices of others; even those dedicated to their care struggle to conceal 
their revulsion, as a former guardian confesses: ‘Is she afraid of you?  We’re all afraid 
of you.  I myself had to fight back my dread of you almost every day’ (Ishiguro, p. 
264).  In the face of such stigma, Ishiguro’s protagonists are compelled to ‘pass’ in 
the world of ‘normals’.  However, strategies of assimilation cannot enable them to 
escape a fundamental condition of their existence: the denial of their right to agency 
and self-determination on the grounds of their status as less than human.  If the 
protagonists of Never Let Me Go are perceived by others to be strange or suspect – 
in other words, ‘queer’ in the commonplace sense – this can be attributed to their 
unconventional relationship to reproductive origin as human clones.   However, I 
would argue that it is not the human status of the clone which is in question in this 
novel so much as the normative discourses which conspire to contest it.  This article 
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seeks to articulate one reader’s intuition concerning the ‘queer’ plight of Ishiguro’s 
protagonists: namely, that the discursive construction of the human clone as 
‘unnatural’ and ‘inhuman’ is implicated in the imperatives of heteronormativity.  In 
other words, I wish to suggest that their queerness is not merely ‘commonplace’ but 
that it also pertains to their non-normative heterosexuality; in this way, it is possible 
to consider Ishiguro’s clones under the extended rubric of ‘queer’ in its theorised 
sense. 
Recent evaluations of queer theory have, following Judith Butler in ‘Critically 
Queer’, sought to “affirm the contingency” (1993, p.230) of the term ‘queer’.  In 
‘What’s Queer About Queer Studies Now?’, David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam and José 
Esteban Muñoz suggest that the ongoing interrogation of the terms by which queer 
defines itself exemplifies queer theory’s commitment to the unsettling of identity 
categories; they suggest that ‘what might be called the “subjectless” critique of 
queer studies disallows any posting of a proper subject of or object for the field by 
insisting that queer has no political referent’ (2005, p. 3, emphasis in original).  
Elsewhere, in ‘Queer Theory for Everyone’, Sharon Marcus acknowledges tensions 
between ‘inclusive’ theorisations of the term (as exemplified in the ‘subjectless’ 
critique above) and a tendency to deploy ‘queer’ as a ‘compact alternative to 
lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender’ (2005, p.196, emphasis in original); moreover, she 
notes that ‘while queerness is supposed to signify the instability of all sexual 
identities . . . there is little extant work on the queerness of those conventionally 
considered heterosexual’ (Marcus, 2005, p.196, emphasis added).1  While the 
protagonists of Never Let Me Go - the narrator Kathy and her childhood friends Ruth 
and Tommy - are nominally heterosexual they are nevertheless at odds with 
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heterosexual norms; more specifically, as the product of technologies of assisted 
reproduction but genetically engineered to be unable to reproduce, their 
relationship to reproductive sexuality is paradoxical.  I would argue that Ishiguro’s 
clones can be interpreted as embodying a heterosexual identity which is 
disempowered and marginalized by heteronormativity; as such they reveal the 
tensions and contradictions at work within and between heterosexuality as an 
institution and an identity.2  Cathy J. Cohen defines heteronormativity as consisting 
of ‘both those localised practices and those centralised institutions which legitimise 
and privilege heterosexuality and heterosexual relationships as fundamental and 
‘natural’ within society’ (1997, p.440).  However, she goes on to question ‘the 
unchallenged assumption of a uniform heteronormativity from which all 
heterosexuals benefit’ (Cohen, 1997, p. 452).  This article does not intend to suggest 
an equivalence between the non-normative heterosexual and the homosexual; while 
an inclusive definition of the term ‘queer’ could encompass both, it would become 
problematic if it obscured the different ways in which they are subject to 
heteronormative institutions, practices and discourses.  What this article seeks to do 
– in speculative and tentative fashion – is to investigate the possibility that Ishiguro’s 
exploration of the contingency of human identity in Never Let Me Go has a 
significant, if oblique, relationship to heteronormative constructions of 
heterosexuality and the human.  Textual motifs of ‘passing’ are central to my 
analysis of Ishiguro’s novel; I wish to suggest that in its exploration of the ‘imitation 
of life’ Never Let Me Go prompts important questions about the discursive 
reproduction of the human as a contested category of identity. 3  
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Remembering to be human: childhood as institution 
 
In her comprehensive survey of fictional representations of human cloning, I Am The 
Other: Literary Negotiations of Human Cloning, Maria Aline Salgueiro Seabra Ferreia 
has described the fantasy of human cloning as ‘focusing in a consummate way the 
widespread millennial anxieties that permeate contemporary literature, popular 
culture, science and medicine’ (1995, p.3).  Indeed, millennial motifs of futurity, 
catastrophe and apocalypse have traditionally characterised fictions of human 
cloning.  Ferreira’s study was published prior to the birth of Dolly, the genetically 
cloned sheep, at the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1996.  Dolly provoked 
extensive scientific, political and ethical debate and renewed public unease about 
the implications of the new genetics and the now foreseeable prospect of human 
cloning.    In this context, with its tremendous potential for the imaginative 
investigation of issues of genetic engineering, gestational origin and industrial 
application, it is all the more striking that Ishiguro’s novel eschews the more 
sensational motifs of science fiction fantasy for a deeply disquieting rendering of 
normality. 
Never Let Me Go - published in 2005 but located in ‘the late 1990’s’ (Ishiguro, 
np) – imagines the near past as speculative future.  It depicts a recognisable and far 
from futuristic British cultural landscape but one in which the mass production of 
human clones in the service of therapeutic medical technology has become 
normalised.  In an analysis of contemporary debates about the technologies of 
human cloning and their ethical implications, Finn Bowring has contextualised the 
emergence of a distinction between ‘therapeutic’ and ‘reproductive’ cloning: 
 5 
It is because treatments derived from embryonic stem cells are likely to 
require the production of human embryos by cloning, that scientists and 
politicians have popularised the distinction between ‘therapeutic’ and 
‘reproductive’ cloning, and made strong moral and legal cases for 
prohibiting the latter (defined as implanting a cloned embryo in a woman’s 
womb).  (2004, p. 403)  
This semantic distinction acts to discursively construct technologies of human 
cloning; to the degree that such a distinction serves political as well as ethical ends it 
is necessarily expedient and fraught with contradiction.  The categorical distinction 
between ‘therapeutic’ and ‘reproductive’ cloning seeks to address anxieties about 
the use of human embryos in medical research but cannot conceal the fact that an 
element of reproduction is integral to all forms of cloning.  ‘Reproductive’ cloning is 
defined in order to be outlawed but this term inadvertently reminds us of the 
position of human cloning within a spectrum of technologies of assisted 
reproduction, most of which are routinely ‘naturalised’ as serving the ‘right to a 
child’.  The problematic nature of the use of therapeutic ends to justify medical 
means is already apparent, in contemporary culture, in the controversial use of 
technologies of assisted reproduction to produce a child whose body will act as a 
resource for an ailing sibling.4   Never Let Me Go imagines a world in which 
genetically cloned embryos are not merely conceived but brought to term and lived 
existence.  Moreover, it is a world in which the distinction between therapeutic and 
reproductive cloning has collapsed; the cloning depicted in the novel is both 
therapeutic and reproductive, in that fully developed cloned bodies are being 
produced in the service of medical science.  As Miss Emily puts it in the dramatic 
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denouement of the novel: ‘ “However uncomfortable people were about your 
existence, their overwhelming concern was that their own children, their spouses, 
their parents, their friends, did not die from cancer, motor neurone disease, heart 
disease” ‘ (Ishiguro, p. 258). Ishiguro’s novel is not concerned with speculation about 
the forms which this technology will take; the absence of engagement with currently 
contentious scientific developments only serves to reinforce the impression that this 
development is neither novel nor new.  Indeed, it is a practice sufficiently 
entrenched to have generated its own counter-discourse which takes the form of a 
social reform movement advocating the humane treatment of cloned subjects: ‘ “we 
demonstrated to the world that if students were reared in humane, cultivated 
environments, it was possible for them to grow to be as sensitive and intelligent as 
any ordinary human being” ‘ (Ishiguro, p. 256).  However, this complex temporal 
context, in which a contemporary medical and ethical controversy is depicted as a 
past reality, is one which the reader must deduce from the narrative which relies not 
on controversial public histories but on subjective memories. 
The first person narrative of Kathy H. is dominated by memories of an 
institutionalised childhood at Hailsham, a residential school resembling a 
paternalistic orphanage: the pupil population at Hailsham is only gradually revealed 
to the reader as consisting of human clones.5  Kathy’s memories reveal the indirect 
and insidious way in which she and her peers learn the truth about their origins and 
their fate; they are ‘told and not told’ (Ishiguro, p. 79) through a process of gradual 
and partial disclosure: ‘It feels like I always knew . . . in some vague way . . . nothing 
came as a complete surprise.  It was like we’d heard everything somewhere before’ 
(Ishiguro, p. 81, emphasis in original).  The reader is arguably placed in a similarly 
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oblique position in relation to narrative knowledge: both ‘told and not told’, she 
must resort to the same speculative and deductive strategies as Kathy.  The novel 
further insinuates the reader into its narrator’s perspective by evoking narrative 
tropes of childhood experience which are recognisable and familiar; Never Let Me Go 
can be placed within a tradition of boarding school narratives in which the closed 
world of the school stands for the institution of childhood.  In this way, the novel 
could be understood as a normalising narrative of human cloning.  Indeed, the 
narrative evokes the peculiar idioms of childhood and young adulthood and their 
function in defining group and individual identities; here the identification of 
‘normals’ (Ishiguro, p. 94) and later of ‘possibles’ (Ishiguro, p. 136).  The struggle 
over prescribed and sequestered spaces - the sports pavilion, the pond, the lunch 
queue and all the ‘hiding places, indoors and out: cupboards, nooks, bushes, hedges’ 
(Ishiguro, p. 43) - recalls the ways in which child and teen identities are mapped out 
through peripheral social territories.  The ‘Exchanges’ and ‘Sales’ (Ishiguro, p.16) 
which punctuate the Hailsham calendar and the shared dedication to the 
accumulation of personal ‘ “collections” ‘ (Ishiguro, p. 38) are also recognisable as 
practices by which a subculture circulates its meanings. 
However, the rituals of child and adolescent cultures are implicated in this 
novel in what is essentially an institution of biotechnological slavery.6  ‘Normals’ are 
the non-cloned humans to whom the Hailsham students are destined to donate their 
vital organs and ‘possible’ is the term given to the imagined human original from 
which the students have been generated.  The quest for privacy evident in the 
struggle for personalised space is countered by the pedagogic and medical 
surveillance to which the students are subject to ensure their fitness for purpose.  
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Finally, the ‘Sales’ and ‘Exchanges’ of used possessions by which the students are 
encouraged to construct their own identities only underline the commodified status 
of their condition.  The clones are, to use Judith Butler’s phrase, ‘foreclosed from 
possibility’ (2004, p. 31) by a genetic origin which determines that their human 
agency will be forfeited.7   The dramatic revelation with which the narrative 
culminates is not so much the identification of Kathy and her classmates as clones, 
however, but rather the disclosure of Hailsham’s identity as a social experiment 
established to ‘prove’ the humanity of clones; the mystery of the fabled gallery in 
which students’ art work is exhibited is revealed: ‘ “We took away your art because 
we thought it would reveal your souls.  Or to put it more finely, we did it to prove 
you had souls at all” ‘ (Ishiguro, p. 255, emphasis in original).  In other words, Kathy’s 
first person narrative culminates with a discovery that her very status as human is 
contested and that the childhood in which her sense of self is rooted was itself 
designed to conceal her contested status from her; ‘ “we sheltered you during those 
years, and we gave you your childhoods” ‘ (Ishiguro, p.263). 
Never Let Me Go generates an apprehension of what it is to discover that 
one’s humanity has been called into question: what it is to find that one’s memories, 
desires and aspirations are perceived to be suspect, inauthentic or illegitimate.  
Contemporary debate and speculation about the prospect of reproductive cloning 
reveals the way in which such beings, as ‘copies’ of human originals, challenge 
notions of the human, especially in relation to issues of individuality, authenticity 
and origin.  In this context, Judith Butler’s reflections, in her 2004 book Undoing 
Gender, are pertinent: 
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It is the inhuman, the beyond human, the less than human, the border that 
secures the human in its ostensible reality.  To be called a copy, to be called 
unreal, is one way in which one can be oppressed, but consider that it is 
more fundamental than that.  To be oppressed means that you already exist 
as a subject of some kind, you are there as the visible and oppressed other 
for the master subject, as a possible or potential subject, but to be unreal is 
something else again.  To be oppressed you must first become intelligible.  
To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of 
culture and of language find you to be an impossibility) is to find that you 
have not yet achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only 
and always as if you were human . . .  (p. 30.  Emphasis added) 
Butler is exploring the implications of the heteronormative denial of the reality of 
homosexual existence and identity: the way in which this refusal to grant legitimacy 
or concede intelligibility reduces a category of beings to less than human status.  
What this passage begins to reveal, I would suggest, is the implication of 
presumptive heterosexuality in definitions of the human – and in the discourses of 
rights to which humans have a claim.  Ishiguro’s cloned protagonists are 
unintelligible both to themselves and to others; I wish to propose that the affective 
power of Never Let Me Go resides in its unsettling of the familiar intelligibility of 
heteronormative identities.  The controversies prompted by the potential prospect 
of reproductive human cloning can be attributed in part to the ways in which it 
challenges the heterosexual prerogative to reproduction; in order to trace how a 
fiction of human cloning might give rise to questions of heteronormativity, I will 
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foreground issues of reproduction and their relationship to normative constructions 
of heterosexuality.   
 
Imitations of life: cloning and the reproduction of heterosexuality 
 
When considered as a technology of assisted reproduction, cloning can be 
approached within the context of the extensive body of feminist scholarship on 
reproductive technologies.  Feminist theorists have investigated these technologies, 
and their supporting discourses, in relation to gendered issues of power, agency and 
embodiment.8  Central to this work is a recognition of the paradoxes of power to 
which these technologies give rise.  On the one hand, reproductive technologies can 
be understood as extending and consolidating the subjection of the female and 
maternal body to the patriarchal power of medical science.  On the other, such 
technologies have the potential to empower women to exercise greater agency and 
control over their bodies and reproductive capacities.  However, while these 
technologies reveal the extent to which conception, gestation and birth are not 
merely culturally mediated but increasingly culturally constructed, these 
interventions have been discursively enlisted to reinforce essentialist assumptions 
about women’s relationship to maternity, most notably through the paradoxical 
renewal of naturalising discourses.   As Dion Farquhar has written: 
The ontology of “natural” biogenetic married heterosexual reproduction 
depended on its binary other of “unnatural” sterility (homosexuals, 
unmarried people, and so on.)  Now, a new “other” to “natural” 
reproduction has been introduced by biotechnology – “artificial” donor-
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assisted asexual reproduction – and it must quickly work to erase its 
otherness . . . by claiming its alliance with the “natural” – helping would-be 
parents have their “own” biogenetic child . . .  (1995, p. 21) 
The converse construction of infertility and childlessness as what Deborah Lynn 
Steinberg has called a ‘pathological medical category’ (1997, p. 41) only reinforces 
the normative effect of new reproductive technologies, extending the medicalisation 
of female bodies.  Extending feminist frameworks of analysis to media 
representations of human cloning, Joan Haran, Jenny Kitzinger, Maureen McNeil and 
Kate O’Riordan have further explored the ways in which women’s bodies are both 
visibly employed as ‘normative signs’ and rendered invisible as a material resource 
for cloning as ‘a disembodied scientific practice’ (2008, p.118).   
Feminist work on reproductive technologies has focussed on their 
implications for women’s agency and experience of embodiment.  However, it is not 
only the ‘naturalness’ of gendered reproductive identity which is in question, I would 
argue, but also, if implicitly, the ‘universality’ of heterosexuality as the origin of 
reproduction.  While the ‘right to reproduce’ is constructed in universalising terms, 
in practice it is reserved for those who conform to heterosexual norms; as Steinberg 
has demonstrated, with reference to access to In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) screening, it 
is not heterosexuality per se which is privileged but more specifically its normative 
manifestations: ‘heterosexuality is policed not only against the prospect of lesbian 
parenting, but indeed what are quite explicitly constructed as deviant familial 
heterosexualities (families without fathers)’ (1997, p. 83).   It could be argued that 
human cloning exponentially extends the challenge posed to heterosexuality as an 
institution by assisted reproduction; as Alan Petersen makes explicit in his analysis of 
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news media coverage of the breakthroughs at the Roslin Institute: ‘What seemed 
“unnatural” and “disturbing” to many people was the prospect of reproduction 
outside normative heterosexual arrangements’ (2002, p. 81).9  I would suggest that 
the heterosexual ‘arrangements’ that are at stake are not simply the sexual acts 
from which conception may result, and the relationships in which they take place, 
but also the social and cultural structures within which heterosexuality is implicated.  
Heterosexuality is a normative identity formation whose power is implicated in its 
capacity to pass unexamined; the ‘impetus to render heterosexuality visible to 
critical scrutiny’ (Johnson, 1997 p. 5) which characterises current work on 
heterosexuality could then be placed within a wider context of critical and 
theoretical frameworks, such as critical whiteness studies and masculinity studies, 
which seek to interrogate the ‘unmarked’ or ‘invisible’ nature of normative identities 
and their relationship to dominant modes of power.  Lauren Berlant and Michael 
Warner evoke the ubiquitous and pervasive force of normative heterosexuality:    
Heteronormativity is more than ideology, or prejudice, or phobia against 
gays and lesbians; it is produced in almost every aspect of the forms and 
arrangements of social life: nationality, the state, and the law; commerce; 
medicine; and education; as well as in the conventions and affects of 
narrativity, romance, and other protected spaces of culture.  (1998, p. 554-
5)  
The specific ‘arrangements of social life’ which I wish to consider in Never Let Me Go 
are those concerning heteronormative structures of family and kinship. 
The relationship between genetics, eugenics and kinship, and its implications 
for a critique of heteronormativity, is one which Deborah Lynn Steinberg has begun 
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to examine.   Steinberg suggests that eugenics can be seen as ‘expressive, indeed 
productive, of a dominant discourse of family, that discourse of “legitimate” kinship 
in which class, gendered and racialised inequalities are normalised and in which 
heterosexuality is assumed and (re)inscribed’ (1997, p. 75-6).  Elsewhere, in a very 
suggestive formulation, Deborah Finkler argues that kinship organises human 
attachments through the production of ‘ “significant same” ‘ groupings who ‘share 
instrumental, moral and affective codes that embrace feelings of obligations and 
responsibilities, which may be limited to one or more several generations of the 
living and the deceased’ (1997, p. 15).  In one sense, Ishiguro’s clones constitute an 
alternative form of kinship; they are ‘significantly same’ to each other due to their 
shared memories and experiences.  Hence Kathy admits her preference for other 
students from Hailsham:  ‘when you get a chance to choose, of course, you choose 
your own kind.  That’s natural’ (Ishiguro, p. 4, emphasis added).  However, their 
kinship is of a fragile constitution, rooted in memories of a place whose future is in 
jeopardy and motivated by the defensive vulnerability of those ‘fearful of the world 
around us . . .unable quite to let each other go’ (Ishiguro, p. 118).  Moreover, their 
kinship lacks the legitimacy of a ‘historical relation to futurity . . . to generational 
narrative and reproduction’ (Berlant and Warner, 1998, p. 554) which 
heteronormativity privileges.  As Never Let Me Go suggests, human cloning does not 
simply bypass conventional modes of human reproduction but produces a new 
category of being whose identity is not imbricated in heterosexuality as an 
institution.  Nominally heterosexual, Kathy and her peers are nevertheless denied 
the privileges with which normative heterosexuality is rewarded;10 this can be 
attributed to the fact of their double alienation from reproductive norms, not only in 
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terms of their origins outside of conventional structures of family and kinship but 
also in terms of their genetically engineered inability to sexually reproduce.  Michael 
Warner alludes to this conflation of heterosexuality and reproduction in his 
discussion of ‘reprosexuality’ as: 
an interweaving of heterosexuality, biological reproduction, cultural 
reproduction, and personal identity. . .   Reprosexuality involves more than 
reproducing, more even than compulsory heterosexuality: it involves a 
relation to the self that finds its proper temporality and fulfilment in 
generational transmission. (1991, p. 9)    
Outside of the generational narrative - without legitimate origin or reproductive 
legacy - the clone is expendable.   
Unclaimed by their genetic kin and unable to generate their own kind, the 
clones are precluded from the networks of obligation and responsibility which define 
the ‘significant same’ according to Finkler; they suffer what Sarah Franklin has 
described as a ‘genealogical shame’ (2007, p.26).11  And yet in other ways they 
uncannily mimic the ‘sameness’ which kinship privileges; genetically identical to their 
‘models’ (Ishiguro, p. 37), they hold a mirror to the reproductive determinism of 
heteronormative kinship.  Moreover, Kathy and her peers have been unknowingly 
schooled in assimilation; they are taught to ‘pass’ as normals within a culture which 
exploits them. I would suggest that this imitative motif serves less to reveal the 
inauthenticity of the cloned subjects than to demonstrate the performative and 
reiterative nature of normative heterosexuality. 
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Schooled to pass: performing and proving  
 
The location of a fiction of human cloning within the narrative context of an 
institutionalised childhood is significant in a number of ways.12  A residential school 
setting can signify either economic privilege or social marginalisation; belonging to 
the latter category, Hailsham’s legacy in terms of childhood memory is comparable 
to that of other casualties of reproductive and familial norms: the abandoned, the 
illegitimate and the disabled child.  Hailsham confirms the clones’ location outside of 
the familial culture of reproductive sexuality and the world of what Kathy refers to as 
the ‘ordinary family’ (Ishiguro, pp. 157, 177, 214); furthermore, it provides an apt 
setting for a depiction of the totalising effect of heteronormative imperatives.  
The trusting docility of Hailsham’s pupils is suggestive of the successful 
internalisation of its regime; both within and beyond the school their lives are 
policed by ‘unspoken’ (Ishiguro, pp. 31; 121) and ‘unwritten’ (Ishiguro, p. 40) rules 
and agreements, many concerning what cannot be openly acknowledged.  Of the 
gallery, Kathy recalls ‘there was an unspoken rule that we should never even raise 
the subject in *the guardians+ presence’ (Ishiguro, p. 31) and yet she reflects that it ‘it 
seems to me that this was a rule we imposed on ourselves, as much as anything the 
guardians had decided’ (Ishiguro, p. 32).  Significantly, Hailsham’s residents remain 
‘students’ long after graduation, readily assuming the role of pupil later in life: ‘we 
gathered round to listen, the way we might have done at Hailsham when a guardian 
started to speak’ (Ishiguro, p. 161).  Moreover, in the disciplinary context of the 
classroom, the students are instructed in the inferiority of their identities.  They are 
informed unambiguously that sex is more meaningful where it can result in 
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conception and birth, something that none of them will experience; hence, their 
sexuality and desires are constructed as poor imitations of those of the ‘normals’: 
Then suddenly . . . [Miss Emily] began telling us how we had to be careful 
about who we had sex with.  Not just because of the diseases but because, 
she said, “sex affects emotions in ways you’d never expect.”  We had to be 
extremely careful about having sex in the outside world, especially with 
people who weren’t students, because out there sex meant all sorts of 
things.  Out there people were even fighting and killing each other over who 
had sex with whom.  And the reason it meant so much – so much more than 
say, dancing or table tennis – was because the people out there were 
different from us students; they could have babies from sex. (Ishiguro, p. 82.  
Emphasis in original.) 
Sexuality becomes less an expression of desire, attachment or pleasure than another 
social discourse which must be learnt and emulated for the purposes of integration.  
Hence Kathy’s adolescent curiosity about sexuality seems not so much expressive of 
her emerging sexual identity as indicative of a struggle to understand a sexuality 
which is given no value: ‘I also spent a lot of time re-reading passages from books 
where people had sex, going over the lines again and again, trying to tease out clues’ 
(Ishiguro, p. 97, emphasis added).  Her confessed interest in a discovered collection 
of pornographic magazines seems more studious than sexual; she discloses that she 
is searching for the face of her ‘possible’ having heard the rumour that the genetic 
models for clones are drawn from the socially marginalized and disempowered.  As 
Ruth puts it: ‘ “We’re modelled from trash.  Junkies, prostitutes, winos, tramps.  
Convicts maybe, just so long as they aren’t psychos” ‘ (Ishiguro, p. 164).  Kathy 
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speculates that her sexual desires, unaccountable to herself in the context of a 
dominant reproductive matrix, must originate in the deviance of her genetic source: 
“It’s just that sometimes, every now and again, I get these really strong 
feelings when I want to have sex. . .  I don’t know what it is, and afterwards, 
when it’s passed over, it’s just scary.  That’s why I started thinking, well, it 
has to come from somewhere.  It must be to do with the way I am.”  
(Ishiguro, p. 179). 
Kathy’s explanation for her interest in pornographic images offers another instance 
where an apparent imitation of conventional heterosexual behaviour reveals, 
instead, its contradictions.  Indeed, performative motifs recur throughout the novel, 
with Kathy repeatedly finding herself an unwitting spectator or actor, positioned ‘as 
if I was in the front row of the audience when *Ruth+ was performing on stage’ 
(Ishiguro, p. 128) or becoming like ‘people in a play *Ruth+ was watching’ (Ishiguro, p. 
216).  In one of a number of uncanny moments which consist in the discovery of 
being watched or in the unwitting watching of others, Kathy finds herself under the 
tearful surveillance of Madame, the school’s enigmatic visiting patron.  She is acting 
out the lyrics to a favourite pop song - ‘baby, baby, never let me go’ (Ishiguro, p. 70) 
– by hugging an imaginary baby to her chest; in doing so, she appears to 
misunderstand the heterosexual vernacular of pop in assuming the ‘baby’ is an infant 
and not a lover.  Madame’s reaction, unfathomable at the time, would 
retrospectively seem to be a response to the futility of the fantasy, both in terms of 
motherhood and heterosexual identity.  And yet Kathy’s actions seem to be 
symptomatic of the imitative schooling which she and her peers receive, in which 
they are encouraged to mimic the behaviour of ‘normals’: a schooling which is itself 
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symptomatic of a wider culture which obsessively rehearses heterosexual subject 
positions. 
In this context, it is worth noting the particular significance with which the 
figure of the couple is invested in Never Let Me Go.  One might expect the vagaries 
of romantic and sexual partnership to play a significant role in a narrative which 
dwells on adolescent group identities.  However, coupledom is understood less as an 
elective expression of a romantic or sexual affinity than as a necessary assumption of 
a culturally coded set of practices: that is, as an index of successful assimilation into 
the world of the ‘normals’.  While staying at the Cottages, a transitional residence 
between Hailsham and the outside world, Kathy detects that some of the gestures 
and phrases by which older couples signify their status have been ‘copied from the 
television’ (Ishiguro, p. 118), including an American sitcom depiction of marital 
conflict: ‘the way they gestured to each other, sat together on sofas, even the way 
they argued and stormed out of rooms’ (Ishiguro, p. 119).  Kathy recalls how her 
assiduously conformist friend Ruth is quick to act on these cues but also Ruth’s 
impatience with her less socially apt partner, Tommy: 
Anyway, my point is, it wasn’t long before Ruth realised the way she’d been 
carrying on with Tommy was all wrong for the Cottages, and she set about 
changing how they did things in front of people . . .  Mind you, at first, 
Tommy didn’t have a clue what was going on, and would turn abruptly to 
Ruth and go: “What?”, so that she’d have to glare furiously at him, like they 
were in a play and he’d forgotten his lines.  I suppose she eventually had a 
word with him, because after a week or so they were managing to do it 
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right, more or less exactly like veteran couples.  (Ishiguro, p. 119.  Emphasis 
added).  
The myth of ‘deferral’, which dominates the closing stages of the narrative, becomes 
all the more poignant given that desires and attachments between students are 
credible only so far as they emulate those of ‘normals.’  Rumours circulate among 
students who have begun their work as donors and carers that a couple can be 
permitted to postpone donations, and hence defer ‘completion’ – the euphemism 
for premature death resulting from the loss of vital organs – if they can ‘prove’ they 
are in love.  This belief is symptomatic both of the students’ suggestibility and of the 
ruthless logic of heteronormativity.  Kathy and Tommy are disabused of the myth of 
deferral - and of the myth of Hailsham - when they locate and confront its former 
patron, Madame, or Marie-Claude, in what they believe to be her home; motifs of 
‘performativity’ and ‘proof’ converge to powerful effect in this scene.13 
Kathy’s attempts to orientate herself within the unfamiliar environment of a 
domestic interior are confounded by the sounds of unidentified movements and 
voices in other parts of the house; the very structure of the room in which she and 
Tommy wait seems to be in flux: ‘The wall at the back of the room began to move.  I 
saw almost immediately it wasn’t really a wall, but a pair of sliding doors which you 
could use to section off the front half of what was otherwise one long room’ 
(Ishiguro, p. 245).  The awkwardness of Madame’s movements and the rather 
charged tone of her address, combined with the sense of shifting spatial boundaries, 
create the impression of a staged encounter: 
When we turned to sit down, she was over by the windows, in front of the 
heavy velvet curtains, holding us in a glare, like we were in class and she 
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was a teacher . . . Tommy, afterwards, said he thought she was about to 
burst into song, and that those curtains behind her would open, and instead 
of the street and the flat grassy expanse leading to the seafront, there’d be 
this big stage set.  (Ishiguro, p. 246) 
Moreover, Kathy discovers that she is not so much the spectator in this scene as an 
unwitting actor in a performance for an undisclosed audience: ‘I realised, with a little 
chill, that these questions had never been for me, or for Tommy, but for someone 
else – someone listening behind us in the darkened half of the room’ (Ishiguro, p 
249).  The revelation that Madame’s rhetorical questions – ‘ “Do I go too far?” ‘ 
(Ishiguro, p. 248)  - are addressed not to Kathy but to the former Hailsham guardian 
Miss Emily, dramatically anticipates the subsequent revelation that Kathy’s 
childhood was itself effectively ‘staged’ for another audience.  As pupils at Hailsham, 
the students are encouraged to compete to produce art work for selection in 
Madame’s gallery, unaware that their efforts are being exhibited as ‘proof’ of their 
humanity.  As adults, Kathy and Tommy hope to ‘prove’ their love to Madame and 
Miss Emily in order to secure what is effectively a stay of execution; however, 
nothing that they are able to ‘produce’ can reverse the conditions of their identity.  
The students can no more enlist the reproductive logic of heterosexuality to ‘prove’ 
their love than can Hailsham ‘prove’ their humanity when heteronormative 
constructions of the human define them as inauthentic in advance.  Hence the 
spurious logic of deferral reveals a more fundamental truth: that the exclusion of 
clones from the human right to self-determination is expressed through the deep 
implication of presumptions of heterosexuality in concepts of the human. 
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In conclusion, Ferreira has noted the ‘feelings of uncanniness’ which often 
accompany fictional representations of human clones, referring to the ‘reservoir of 
disquiet that many of these clone characters attempt to dispel by trying to build a 
life predicated, as much as possible, on normality . . .’ (1995, p. 35).   However, the 
first person narrative of Never Let Me Go mitigates against the construction of the 
clone as ‘other’ to the reader; moreover, it is the implicitly normative status of the 
reader - which such ‘othering’ might serve to sanction - which is rendered uncanny 
by the narrative mode of address.  In a recurring and poignant refrain, the narrator 
addresses the reader and wonders ‘how it was where you were . . .’ (Ishiguro, pp 13; 
67; 94).  This direct address seems to interpellate the reader as a peer, a fellow 
graduate of an institutionalised childhood; while this might be read as further 
evidence of the discomforting naivety of the adult narrator it can equally be read as 
being suggestive of the way in which we are all schooled to ‘pass’ as normals.  In an 
essay assessing current work in heterosexuality studies, Annette Schlichter has 
argued that ‘it is crucial that we develop an understanding of heterosexual 
subjection as an overdetermined process of ‘becoming straight’ under the conditions 
of heteronormativity’ (2004, p. 559).  The peculiarity of the Hailsham regime reveals, 
in metaphorical fashion, the paradoxes and perversity of heteronormativity.  The 
imitative schooling by which the clones are taught to pass as ‘normals’ reveals the 
performative nature of heteronormativity; nominally heterosexual in terms of their 
sexuality, the protagonists of Ishiguro’s novel nevertheless suffer the penalties 
endured by those constructed as ‘other’ to the reproductive norm.  Evidently, Never 
Let Me Go is not about heterosexuality in any explicit or exclusive way; indeed, 
readers of the novel may feel that, like Madame, I ‘go too far’ (Ishiguro, p.  248).  But 
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such is the normative nature of heterosexuality and its ‘unmarked’ or ‘invisible’ 
status that few cultural narratives could announce themselves in such a way.  By 
reading Never Let Me Go as a narrative of passing within a heteronormative world, I 
have attempted to cast into relief the contradictions inherent in the conflation of 
reproductive sexuality and heterosexuality by heteronormativity; that is, to suggest 
that one effect of Ishiguro’s uncanny fiction is to reveal the way in which 
heterosexuality as an institution both produces and penalises non-normative 
heterosexual identities. 
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1
 Recent work on ‘queer heterosexuality’ offers one alignment of queer theory and heterosexuality; 
see Thomas (2000) and Fantina (2006).  For a critical evaluation of this movement see Schlichter 
(2004). 
2
 Stevi Jackson, for example, argues against “conflating heterosexuality as an institution with 
heterosexual practice, experience and identity’ (1991, p.123). 
3
 Linda Schlossberg, in her ‘Introduction’ to Passing: Identity and Interpretation in Sexuality, Race, and 
Religion, writes that ‘heterosexual culture continually passes itself off as being merely natural, the 
undisputed and unmarked norm’ (2001 p.5).  Ishiguro’s clones are heterosexuals who must 
nevertheless work hard to assume the ‘unmarked’ privileges of the norm / ‘normals’ (Ishiguro, p.94). 
4
 I am referring here to the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) or tissue typing in IVF to 
produce a child whose umbilical cord, blood or bone marrow can be employed in the treatment of an 
existing sibling; such children have come to be known as ‘saviour siblings’.  I would suggest that 
Bowring’s concerns about the fate of a genetically cloned child are arguably already applicable to the 
genetically engineered child: ‘the respect, love and recognition ideally expressed by adults towards 
the child will be subverted by their expectation that they have ordered a predetermined product . . .’ 
(2004, p. 405, emphasis in original). 
5
 In the context of a fictional memoir, the use of initials to abbreviate a character’s surname may 
seem an act of narrative discretion; however, in Never Let Me Go it also indicates the absence of a 
patronym and of the family identity to which it refers. 
6
 Margaret Everett makes an analogy with slavery in her discussion of the contemporary 
commodification of the gene: ‘The commodification of the body is not a new phenomenon; slavery, 
prostitution and the sale of corpses, for example, attest to this fact’ (2003, p. 58). 
7
 Butler writes that ‘If we are not recognizable, if there are no norms of recognition by which we are 
recognizable, then it is not possible to persist in one’s own being, and we are not possible beings; we 
have been foreclosed from possibility’ (2004, p. 31). 
8
 See, for example, Franklin (1987), Kaplan and Squier (1999) and Stanworth (1997). 
 24 
                                                                                                                             
9
 Moreover, Franklin describes as ‘queer’ Dolly the sheep’s ‘connections to sex and modes of 
reproduction’ (2007, p. 46). 
10
 Ruth and Tommy are former lovers and the more abiding bond between Kathy and Tommy finds 
expression when they become partners later in life.  The Hailsham pupils are sufficiently entrenched 
in heteronormativity to have generated their own idiom for the insinuation of homosexuality: ‘Gay 
sex, incidentally, was something we were even more confused about.  For some reason, we called it 
“umbrella sex” . . .I don’t know how it was where you were, but at Hailsham we definitely weren’t at 
all kind towards any sign of gay stuff’ (Ishiguro, p. 94).   
11
 Sarah Franklin attributes the anxiety with which ‘illicit clones’ are met directly to their relationship 
to genealogy: ‘The dangerous illicit clone, its negativity doubled by both its figurative and historical 
associations, is generically and traditionally an abject embodiment of a particular kind of genealogical 
shame.  Suspected of being a fake, a derivative, a copy, or a mere replicant, the clone is diminished by 
a lack of proper genealogy – and thus identity, substance, or origin’ (2007 p. 26, emphasis added). 
12
 Keith McDonald suggests that ‘novels which depict schooling provide a fruitful forum by which the 
narrator’s agency in a complex power structure can be framed, questioned, and understood’  (2007, 
p.77). 
13
 The house to which Kathy and Tommy follow Marie Claude appears also to be the home of Miss 
Emily; Marie Claude is a former colleague of, and seemingly a present carer for, Miss Emily, who 
attributes her use of a wheelchair to recent ill health.  The possibility that the two women are a 
couple is one which does not seem to occur to Kathy. 
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